World Trade Organization’s Identity Crisis: Institutional Legitimacy and Growth Potential in the Developing World by Wiener, Jason
1Jason Wiener
World Trade Organization’s Identity Crisis: Institutional Legitimacy and Growth 
Potential in the Developing World
Over and above multilateral system, we need…to promote the social ethics of 
globalization…there is no future in globalization that tolerates predatory 
behavior and the hoarding of its profits by a minority…There is no future in 
globalization that destroys the social and environmental balances…It is up to us 
to refuse these drifts and to give globalization a conscience and social ethics, to 
give it its full legitimacy and meaning at the service of humankind.1
The free trade paradigm that envelops the new economic order is facing a mid-life crisis.  
Trade liberalization is a polarizing concept that has divided scholars, trade experts, jurists, 
economists and trade blocs alike into two opposing schools of thought.  Both sides proclaim they 
possess the holy grail of trade theory to eliminate economic inequality and rid the world of 
nefarious paradoxes.  Much of the debates have borne themselves out in the last decade as the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) system developed into the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) and an incipient body of jurisprudence began to tackle difficult 
analytical, institutional, self-identity and political questions.  
The result of institutionalized global trade rules and semi-regular ministerial summits has 
been a bifurcated agenda whereby developed countries and well-established trade blocs negotiate 
highly self-satisfying trade policies while the developing world scrambles to interject a 
development agenda that presently appears incompatible with existing policies.  The developing 
countries must simultaneously juggle their domestic development, attempt to juxtapose trade 
rules that fit their needs, and struggle to reshape the dominant free trade philosophy to yield to its 
interests.  They do so within an uncompromising system that favors unbridled economic 
competition over progressive implementation.  Further, the WTO’s judicial branch, comprised of 
1
 Jacques Chirac, speaking at the unveiling of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalization report, A Fair Globalization: Implementing the Millennium Declaration, ILO/04/42 (Sept. 
20, 2004).
2the Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body, has explicitly excluded protection for the 
developing world’s most potent comparative advantage- labor and cultural uniqueness.  As trade 
principles continue to buttress the relative influence of developed countries to establish 
preferential rules vis-à-vis the developing world, the system risks losing legitimacy among the 
beneficiaries of international trade.2
Therefore, this Article will suggest a novel perspective on WTO jurisprudence that 
focuses on the existing legal foundation for supporting interests of the developing world, and 
illustrates that latent resources exist in the developing world that are worthy of WTO protection 
and enforcement.  Hence, this Article will argue that the future expansion and even the continued 
feasibility of the WTO’s trade liberalization model rest squarely on its willingness to incorporate 
and promote the developing world’s agenda in a way that recognizes cultural uniqueness and 
production process as intrinsic components of internationally traded goods and services.
I. Integral Connection Between Developing Countries’ Agenda and GATT 
Instruments
This section will analyze several provisions of the principle trade instruments that give rise to 
special or differential treatment for developing countries.  The foregoing will demonstrate that 
the interests of the developing world lie at the heart of the legal structure empowered to interpret 
and administer trade rules.
A. The WTO- Institution and ‘Constitution’
2
 “Globalization’s benefits have been unevenly distributed, with many of its burdens falling hardest on 
those who can least protect themselves…Too many people, particularly in developing countries, feel 
excluded and threatened by globalization…They feel that they are the servants of markets, when it should 
be the other way around…We should not forget that, in a range of areas- including trade…solemn 
promises have been made.  We should not await institutional reform before summoning the political will 
to keep those promises.”  Kofi Annan, speaking at the unveiling of the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalization report, A Fair Globalization: Implementing the Millennium Declaration, 
ILO/04/42 (Sept. 20, 2004).
3In the WTO Agreement, the preamble proclaims a platitudinous recognition for the need to 
secure for developing countries and least developed countries (“LDC”) a share of the growth of 
international trade proportionate to their developmental needs.3  Article 3 of the same agreement 
ends with an understanding that the WTO should coordinate its global economic policy-making 
with other international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”).4
The WTO’s judicial branch is governed by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), 
which empowers the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) to administer the rules and procedures, 
and to establish panels and adopt panel and appellate body decisions.5  The DSU prescribes 
overarching policy guidelines to direct its decision making; including providing security and 
predictability, preserving the rights and obligations of Members, and significantly, to clarify 
existing rules and agreements in conformity with customary rules of interpretation and public 
international law.6  Additionally, when a Dispute Settlement Panel adjudicates a particular 
dispute, it has the right to seek information and technical advice from either the parties or any 
appropriate third party; presumably, this includes information regarding local custom or varying 
perspectives on legal entitlement to trade benefits.7
3
 World Trade Organization Agreement, prea. 2nd para. [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
4
 WTO Agreement, Art. 3. Critically, the mission of the World Bank is to reduce and ultimately eradicate 
global poverty through developmental and institutional reform.  See World Bank Mission Statement, at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:36602~the
SitePK:29708,00.html (Dec. 9, 2004).  Most of the World Bank’s work focuses on developing countries.  
Id.
5
 Dispute Settlement Understanding, Art. 2, § 1.  [hereinafter DSU].
6
 DSU, Art. 3, §§ 2 and 3.
7
 DSU, Art. 13.
4The 1947 GATT is the constitution that provides the institutional framework in which the 
DSB and the WTO operate.8  The GATT establishes the notion that trade should be aimed at 
raising living standards, ensuring full employment, and developing the full use of world 
resources through expanding production and exchange of goods.9  In order to have meaning, this 
expression of general purpose must underlie the Panel and Appellate Body’s jurisprudence and 
must influence doctrinal development.  
In Article 3, the so-called National Treatment clause, the GATT draws a bright-line around 
“like products,” and accords them equal treatment once they have entered a host country’s
domestic market.10  This Article has been the subject of innumerable litigations surrounding 
cultural and societal definitions of “like” and “directly substitutable or competitive” products, 
and whether the definitions are susceptible to a market criteria analysis or a generalized intrinsic 
properties analysis.11  Article 3’s protectionism proviso is also important because it recognizes 
that protectionism is sometimes a legitimate interest and it incorporates the GATT’s Trade and 
Development section by reference.12
Many consider Article 4, termed the “cinema exception,” a unique cultural exception that 
permits import quotas for foreign films.13  This quota exception for cinematographic films 
reflects an underlying value in cultural sensitivity and serves as a “hook” for developing 
8 Cf., Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or 
Global Subsidiarity?, appearing in Deliberately Democratizing Multilateral Organization, Governance, 
2003.
9
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Prea. para. 2, Oct. 30, 1947. [hereinafter GATT].
10
 GATT, Art. 3, § 2.  The “like” products clause will become crucial to section 3’s analysis of cultural 
uniqueness and values in trade.
11 See e.g. European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, Appellate Body Report adopted by the DSB on Apr. 5. 2001.
12
 GATT, Art. 3, § 1; GATT, Arts. 36-38. 
13
 GATT, Art. 4; Chi Carmodi, When “Cultural Identity Was not at Issue”: Thinking About Canada-
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Law & Policy in International Business, Jan. 1, 1999.
5countries who must defend seemingly protectionist trade measures.14  At a minimum, Article 4 
affirms the right of developing countries to shield their national culture from foreign penetration 
to the extent films act as cultural conduits.
In Article 9, the GATT addresses marks of origin, which Members often require to denote 
country of origin on imported products.15  This article purports to limit a Member’s ‘marking’ 
requirements to a standard that does not overly burden the product’s exporter.16  Beyond the 
textual requirements, Article 9 implicitly recognizes a Member’s interest in identifying a 
product’s country of origin.  Whether such information is relevant for tariff or duty purposes, or 
because such information is an intrinsic component of the product itself, the ‘mark’ makes goods 
unique to its country of origin.17
Article 18 justifies a Member’s protectionist behavior if done for the purpose of 
implementing an economic development policy aimed at raising the standard of living.18
Examples of permissible protections include tariff barriers and narrowly targeted quantitative 
restrictions.19  Only developing countries and those with low standards of living are permitted to 
temporarily deviate from other GATT obligations.20  Notably, the remaining Article 18 
provisions treat developing countries and LDC’s differently on account of their disparate level of 
development and prescribe permissible deviations from other GATT principles.21  Article 18 thus 
embodies the principle that developing countries merit special protections and greater flexibility 
14 See Carmodi, supra note 13 at 8.
15
 GATT, Art. 9.
16 Id.
17
 Anecdotally, consumers often discriminate between products based on the location of production.  For 
example, consumers may prefer Burgundy (made in France), versus Chianti (made in Italy).
18
 GATT, Art. 18.
19
 GATT, Art. 18, § 2.
20
 GATT, Art. 18, § 4.
21
 GATT, Art. 18, §§ 7-23.
6in trade liberalization.  The developing world’s margin of appreciation to define the terms of its 
own industrial development underlies this principle of special treatment.22
Article 20 of the GATT contains the so-called social-clauses because it carves out exceptions 
for, inter alia: protection of public morals, compliance with other laws or regulations not 
inconsistent with the GATT, prohibition of prison labor, protection of national treasures with 
historic or archeological value and protection of natural exhaustible resources.23  Naturally, 
litigation has focused on whether to construe these exceptions broadly or narrowly so as to afford 
a modicum of domestic control over trade that affects the foregoing.  In the context of 
developing countries that seek to defend allegedly protectionist trade measures, Article 20 is 
designed to shift the burden to the party seeking to limit trade.24  This creates a presumption that 
international trade measured in dollars trumps a country’s right to protect its collective values.25
Nevertheless, Article 20 provides a broad legal foundation from which developing countries can 
assert their right to define, develop and protect collective values and culture.26
Article 36 and 37 establish a trade and development agenda within the WTO that should also 
influence the jurisprudence of the DSB.27  Article 36 lays out principles and objectives, 
including: improving the standard of living, progressively developing economies, recognizing 
that export interests are vital to LDC’s and developing countries, export earnings are vital to 
22
 In accordance with public international law, interpreting judicial bodies must accord Member States a 
certain margin of appreciation regarding their adherence to the GATT.  See supra note 6 and 
accompanying text.
23
 GATT, Art. 20, §§ a-j.
24
 GATT, Art. 20.  Measures must not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against imports 
and the measure must not amount to a disguised restriction on international trade.  Id.
25
 Panel and Appellate Body reports in several cases discussed below exacerbate this presumption and 
make it virtually irrebuttable. 
26
 Article 20 is also a last resort in the event that the Panel, and more likely the Appellate Body, view 
culture as extrinsic to the traded goods themselves.  If the argument prevails that values and culture are 
intrinsic properties of products, a Member country can defend disparate product treatment under Article 
3’s National Treatment provision, and specifically the “like” products analysis.  See supra note 10 and 
accompanying text; infra Part III.
27
 GATT, Arts. 36-37.
7economic development, and acknowledging the gap in standard of living between LDC’s and 
other countries.28 Article 36 reaffirms the principle that the GATT affords developing countries 
and LDC’s special and differential treatment.29  This article reflects the underlying principle that 
developing countries shall be accorded protection and treated fairly on account of their unique 
economic and developmental circumstances.  It would not be logically inconsistent to suggest 
according Article 20 or even Article 3 protection to developing countries on account of the 
uniqueness of their cultural and other self-identified values.  Article 37 goes on to require that 
developed countries treat the interests of developing countries and LDC’s with equity and 
priority.30  This includes, inter alia, reducing trade barriers, eliminating tariff barriers or import 
duties on LDC-produced goods and maintaining equitable trade margins on government-
determined prices.31
B. Focused Trade Agreements- Special and Differential Treatment Clauses
Many of the specific trade agreements contain provisions that confer special status and rights 
to developing countries.  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”), which purports to establish a multilateral framework for protecting 
intellectual property, aims to promote technological innovation and the dissemination thereof in 
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare.32  In order to facilitate its goals, TRIPS 
seeks to balance the rights and obligations of producers and users of intellectual property.33
28
 GATT, Art. 36.
29 Id.  Article 36 further provides that positive efforts must ensure that developing countries gain the 
benefits of trade commensurate with their need for economic development, favorable and acceptable 
conditions of market access must be granted to developing countries reliant on export revenue, equitable 
prices shall be paid as remuneration, economic diversification within developing countries shall be 
promoted, etc.  Id.
30
 GATT, Art. 37.
31 Id. at §§ 1 & 2.
32
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 7. [hereinafter TRIPS].
33 Id.
8Article 8 confers on Members the right to adopt measures to protect public health and nutrition, 
and to promote the public interest in sectors that are important to technological and socio-
economic development.34  Implicit in this provision is the right of Members to self-identify 
within a recognized margin of appreciation what constitutes public interest and whether 
measures are designed to promote it.
Section three of TRIPS provides for the protection of geographical indicators that “identify a 
good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory.”35
Article 22 recognizes that geographical indicators are important to symbolize quality, reputation 
and other characteristics of a good that are intrinsic to its value.36  Article 23 provides additional 
protection for the geographic indicators of wines and spirits.37  In toto, Section three expresses 
the underlying assumption that the place of origin is an intrinsic characteristic of goods.
In theory, Part six of TRIPS, which covers transitional arrangements, treats developing 
and LDC’s differently and permits them to progressively implement intellectual property 
protections.38  The text of Article 65 authorizes developing countries to transitionally implement 
intellectual property regimes within five years of the date of application.39  Further, Article 66 
allows LDC’s ten years from the date of application to implement an intellectual property 
regime.40  Developed countries are encouraged to provide domestic incentives to promote 
technology transfer to LDC’s.41  At its core, Part six recognizes the special circumstances of 
34
 TRIPS, Art. 8.
35
 TRIPS, Art. 22.
36 Id.
37
 TRIPS, Art. 23.
38
 TRIPS, Arts. 65-66.
39
 TRIPS, Art. 65.
40
 TRIPS, Art. 66.
41 Id.
9developing countries and LDC’s and permits them to slowly transition towards recognizing and 
protecting intellectual property- a notably western convention.
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS 
Agreement”) contains special technical assistance and differential treatment provisions for 
developing countries and LDC’s with respect to adopting measures to protect human, animal or 
plant life.42  Article 9 promotes technical assistance especially to developing countries through 
either bilateral agreements or through appropriate international organizations.43  The goal of such 
technical assistance is to permit developing countries to maintain and expand market access for 
products implicated by the SPS Agreement.44  Further, Article 10 is the special and differential 
treatment clause, which recognizes the special needs of developing countries and permits them to 
phase-in sanitary and phytosanitary measures.45  Critically, section 3 allows for specified, time-
limited exceptions from SPS obligations in order for developing countries to meet their 
developmental needs first.46
In the case of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMS 
Agreement”), developing countries are permitted to freely deviate temporarily from obligations 
to reduce inappropriate investment restrictions.47  Article 5 extends the transition period for 
compliance with the TRIMS Agreement from two years for developed countries, to five years for 
developing countries, and seven years for LDC’s.48  Special and differential treatment in the case 
of investment measures is especially important for developing countries because domestic 
42
 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement].
43
 SPS Agreement, Art. 9.
44
 SPS Agreement, Art. 9, § 2.
45
 SPS Agreement, Art. 10.
46
 SPS Agreement, Art. 10, § 3.
47
 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Art. 3. [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement].
48
 TRIMS Agreement, Art. 5.
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control over the use of locally produced products, employment of domestic labor, and other 
investment restrictions are critical to their trade and social development.
The Agreement on Agriculture, which commits Members to liberalizing their agriculture 
industry, is of great interest to the developing world because enormous agricultural subsidies in 
developed countries are strangling market access for the developing world.  Hence, the 
Agricultural Agreement commits developed countries to improving market access for 
agricultural products from developing countries and fully liberalizing trade in tropical 
agricultural products.49  Further, Article 6 purports to exempt developing countries from 
requirements that they reduce agricultural input subsidies in order to encourage agricultural and 
rural development.50  Like other special and differential treatment provisions in aforementioned 
agreements, Articles 15 and 16 recognize relative economic imbalances and permits developing 
countries flexibility and leverage in meeting agricultural liberalizations obligations.51  In its 
totality, the Agricultural Agreement seeks to equalize the trade status of developing countries by 
promoting greater market access for their agricultural products and exempting their subsidies in 
this sector.
The Safeguards Agreement also contains critical exceptions for developing countries 
designed to promote their socio-economic and developmental status.  Although the Safeguards 
Agreement regulates maintenance of temporary industry-wide safeguards, Article 9 provides that 
no such safeguard shall be applied against a product originating in a developing country.52
49
 Agricultural Agreement, Prea.
50
 Agricultural Agreement, Art. 6.
51
 Agricultural Agreement, Arts. 15 & 16.
52
 Safeguards Agreement, Art. 9. In order to qualify for the exception, a developing country’s exports 
subject to a particular safeguard must not exceed three percent of total imports into the country seeking to 
maintain the safeguard and may not exceed nine percent of total imports of the product concerned.  Id. at 
§ 1.
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Additionally, a developing country may extend application of a safeguard for up to two years 
beyond the eight-year maximum.53
Lastly, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) commits to increasing 
participation of developing countries in the services trades.54  Article 4 provides that to 
accomplish such expansion, Members shall negotiate commitments to: strengthen their domestic 
services capacity, increase efficiency and competitiveness through access to technology; improve 
access to distribution channels and information networks, and liberalize market access in sectors 
of interest to developing countries.55  This provision is critical to the developing world’s trade 
agenda because it purports to cater to their special needs and interests.  This provision implicitly 
authorizes developing countries to develop their services trade through their own institutions and 
capacity building with assistance from the developed world.  Article 4 obligates developed 
countries to provide specific forms of assistance and it gives LDC’s heightened priority.56
The foregoing recognizes the special rights and needs of developing countries and 
supports a broad interpretation of clauses that afford special and differential treatment.  Dispute 
Settlement Panels and the Appellate Body should heed the ubiquity of such language in the many 
trade instruments and accord greater deference to and protection for measures that developing 
countries maintain. 
II. Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body Decisions- Indifferent to Culture 
and Developing Status
Within the jurisprudence of the Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body, examples of 
cultural indifference, economic presumptuousness, moral vacuity, and analytical isolation 
53
 Safeguards Agreement, Art. 9, § 2.
54
 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Prea. [hereinafter GATS].
55
 GATS, Art. 4, § 1.
56
 GATS, Art 4, §§ 2 & 3.
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abound.  This Article will discuss some of the premier illustrations and will introduce the DSB’s 
“like products” analysis.
“Like products” issues primarily arise under GATT Article 3’s National Treatment provision.  
Members must accord similar treatment to “like products” once they enter a domestic market.57
Where products are not “like,” but are “directly competitive or substitutable,” importing 
countries may not discriminate between them upon entry into the domestic market.58  The 
analysis for competitive or substitutable products is broader and necessitates investigation into 
whether protectionist motives exist.59  For the purposes of this Article’s discussion, there are two 
predominant “like product” analyses, one more culturally competent than the other.
In 1970, The Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments established a factors test for 
determining likeness, which takes into account: “the product’s end-uses in a given market, 
consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; [and] the product’s 
properties, nature and quality.”60  This test is considered the high-water mark for the range of 
considerations because it involves both objective factors, relating to the product’s physical 
properties, and subjective factors, like its end-use and varying consumer tastes.  
The alternate approach to “like products” is narrower and entirely objective because it 
considers the product’s physical properties and its tariff classification alone.61  In the sequel to 
the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, the Panel examined Japan’s customs duties, taxes and labeling 
57 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text; Chi Carmody, When “Cultural Identity Was Not an 
Issue”: Thinking About Canada- Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Law and Policy in 
International Business 231, Jan. 1, 1999.
58
 GATT, Art. 3, § 2.
59 Id.  Section 2 contains a proviso that harkens back to section 1’s last paragraph.  The language bars 
discrimination that affords protection to domestic products.  Id.
60
 Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, Dec. 2, 1970, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 97 (1970).
61 See WTO Panel Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, paras. 6.18, 6.22 (1996) 
[hereinafter Japan-Alcoholic Beverages]; see also Carmody, supra note 57.
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practices for imported wines and alcoholic beverages.62  Japan maintained highly specified 
definitions for alcoholic beverages, in particular for a traditional Japanese spirit called shochu, to 
protect its culturally unique products.  Without belaboring the text of the panel’s decision, suffice 
it is to say that the panel downplayed the importance and relevance of consumer tastes- which it 
considered solely a function of economics, relating to price, availability and its competitive 
relationships with other products- and focused on objective economic factors.63  When the newly 
formed Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body revisited the case in its delinquency phase 
in 1995, they applied a “marketplace” test that considered the elasticity of substitution.64  This 
increasingly narrow methodology has dispensed with consumer tastes and end-uses as 
meaningful definitions.65
The Panel and Appellate Body faced another trade dispute that involved sensitive cultural 
issues in Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals. 66  This case involved a dispute 
over a Canadian excise tax that regulated the content of advertising in imported magazines.  The 
United States perceived the tax as a direct attack on an American magazine, Sports Illustrated, 
which recently began running editorialized split-run editions in Canada.67  The Panel considered 
the “likeness” of the editorial content in the Sports Illustrated magazines compared to that 
contained in a Canadian magazine, Harrowsmith Country Life.68  Although Canada argued that 
62 See GATT Panel Report, Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and 
Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83 (1987). 
63 Id. at 117, 119; see also Carmody, supra note 57.
64 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Oct. 4, 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
at n. 46; see also Carmody, supra note 57.
65 See generally Carmody, supra note 57. 
66
 For a more detailed factual recount, see Carmody, supra note 57 at § IV (B).
67 Id. See also WTO Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Mar. 14, 1997, 
WT/DS31/R [hereinafter Canada-Periodicals Panel Report]; WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada-
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Jun. 30, 1997, WT/DS31/AB/R [hereinafter Canada-
Periodicals Appellate Body Report ].
68 See supra note 67.
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the cultural content of a magazine should be considered its prime characteristic, the Panel 
analyzed the magazines’ end uses and similar physical properties, natures and qualities.69  Based 
on this limited inquiry, the Panel concluded that the products were “like” and that the Canadian 
excise tax violated GATT’s Article 3.70
On appeal, the Appellate Body avoided the “like products” issue by concluding that the Panel 
Report lacked adequate analysis and let stand the Panel’s legal conclusions.71  The language in 
the Appellate Body’s analysis resembled that in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages and 
“demonstrated indifference to the fact that the case dealt with a unique product- a cultural good-
and that the GATT and WTO function not only within markets, but also in a broader political, 
social, and cultural environment.”72  Despite that the Canadian magazine maintains an interest in 
identifying and publishing its own culture- specific content, the Appellate Body eschewed its 
value and concluded that the U.S. magazine’s content was a substitute for “Canadian” content.73
The trend in the Panel and Appellate Body’s “like products” analysis towards physical 
characteristics and marketplace behavior overlooks cultural distinctions and the right and ability 
of countries to autonomously identify their cultural trademarks.  Such a narrow focus ignores 
qualitative and subjective features of a product and leads to an inference that a country’s 
differential treatment of certain imports is inherently protectionist.  Moreover, the “marketplace” 
test demeans and undervalues consumers’ tastes and habits by describing their behavior as purely 
69 See Canada-Periodicals Panel Report, supra note 67, paras. 3.71, 5.25.
70 Id. at para. 5.26.
71 See Canada- Periodicals Appellate Body Report, supra note 67 at 22.  The Appellate Body proceeded 
to analyze the Canadian magazine under a “substitutability” analysis and applied the marketplace test.  Id.
at 25; Carmody, supra note 57.
72 See Carmody, supra note 57 at § IV (D).
73 See Canada-Periodicals Appellate Body Report, supra note 67 at 29; Carmody, supra note 57 at § IV 
(D).
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economic.  The Appellate Body has forsaken analysis of difficult legal, philosophical, and 
cultural questions that inhere in products’ end-uses and consumer tastes.
In Indian Pharmaceuticals, the Panel and Appellate Body displayed contempt and 
impatience for India’s developing legal system that had not yet integrated intellectual property 
protections.  Under the TRIPS agreement, the United States complained that the Indian patent 
system lacked adequate intellectual property protections for pharmaceutical products.  Despite 
India’s qualification for an extended transition towards implementing such protections, TRIPS 
required India to maintain a “mailbox” repository for patent applications while it developed its 
patent laws.74  To comply with the mailbox requirement, India’s legislature created an 
administrative system to register and collect patent applications; however, the Panel concluded 
that India’s administrative process failed to preserve the “novelty and priority” of the patent 
applications.75
On appeal, India challenged that its administrative system was a sufficient “means” for 
accepting applications and that it had created an adequate “mechanism” for creating and 
protecting exclusive marketing rights.76  The Appellate Body chastised the Panel for its 
interpretive breadth, which considered whether India’s administrative patent system had satisfied 
U.S. legitimate expectations, and analyzed the authoritative weight of India’s municipal laws.77
The Appellate Body compared India’s “administrative instructions” regarding patent applications 
to the U.S. Patent Act.78  After interpreting domestic law, the Appellate Body concluded that 
74
 TRIPS, Art. 70, §§ 8-9.
75 See WTO Panel Report, India-Patent Protection For Pharmaceutical And Agricultural Chemical 
Products, Sept. 5, 1997, WT/DS50/R [hereinafter India-Pharmaceuticals Panel Report]; WTO Appellate 
Body Report, India-Patent Protection For Pharmaceutical And Agricultural Chemical Products, Dec. 17, 
1997, WT/DS50/AB/R [hereinafter India-Pharmaceuticals Appellate Body Report].
76 India-Pharmaceuticals Appellate Body Report, supra note 75 at § II (A).
77 Id. at § III.
78 Id.
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India’s administrative patent system failed to preserve the novelty and priority of patent 
applications made during the transition period.79  India retorted that the Panel had misinterpreted 
the authority of municipal law within India’s legal system.80
The Appellate Body’s interpretation of India’s municipal law displayed legal naiveté and 
cultural insensitivity because it failed to consider India’s own description of the weight of 
administrative instructions within its legal system.  The Appellate Body should have deferred to 
India’s definition and interpretation of its legal structure because it is they who have developed 
it.  The adequacy and sufficiency of India’s administrative patent system are shaped within 
India’s legal culture and depend on the legal significance Indian law accords, and thus, the 
Appellate Body ought to resist second-guessing.  Further, the Appellate Body displayed obtuse 
insensitivity to India’s developing status by comparing the authority of its municipal law to the 
U.S. Patent Act, which was promulgated within a well-developed formal legal system.  By such 
decisional conduct, the Appellate Body eviscerated the meaning of TRIP’s transitional exception 
for developing countries by requiring a high level of interim patent protection.  Further, it 
stripped India of its margin of appreciation in adhering to TRIPS.81
III. Trade and Cultural Uniqueness - Values to Unlock Developing World’s 
Potential
Although the Panel and Appellate Body have engrafted onto GATT’s Article 3 “like 
products” jurisprudence an indifference to many factors that contribute to a product’s end-use, 
goods produced in developing countries and LDC’s uniquely reflect sensitive and vulnerable 
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Cf., supra notes 32-34, 38-41 and accompanying text.
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local culture and social values.82  Widget A and Widget B may appear physically identical 
despite production in a developed country and a developing country respectively; however, 
tangible social values and unique production processes inhere therein to distinguish between 
them in critical ways.83
Thus, Panels and the Appellate Body should analyze otherwise “like” products in light of the 
labor conditions under which they were manufactured, an importing country’s collective 
preferences, inherent characteristics of quality and craftsmanship, unique local or indigenous 
production methods, local or indigenous novelty of the good itself, and other socio-cultural 
characteristics.  Therefore, Panels and the Appellate Body should not presume protectionist 
intent when countries maintain trade restrictions to reflect these values, but should rather defer to 
the country’s proffer of a legitimate collective preference.
The relationship between societal values and international trade is not new; however, 
recognizing that culture and values are intrinsic to traded goods is the key to unlocking latent 
potential in the developing world.84  This Article suggests that international trade law must 
recognize that culture and values underlie the collective preferences of countries seeking to 
maintain trade restrictions and must recognize that culture and values associated with goods 
produced in the developing world distinguish otherwise “like products.”  This Article will 
demonstrate that “like products” jurisprudence lags behind the reality that societal values and 
culture matter to end-users.
82
 This does not imply a certain banality to culture in the developed world.  On the other hand, social 
values and culture in developing countries should be given special attention in an effort to envision novel 
methods of reducing poverty, and promoting development.
83 See Philip Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 658 (Winter 1996); Michael Braun, Leigh 
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 For the purpose of this Article, societal values is defined as “an enduring belief that a specific mode of 
conduct or end state is personally or societally preferable relative to an opposite or converse mode of 
conduct or end state of existence.”  See Nichols, supra note 83 at 667. 
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Professor Nichols identifies why, theoretically, culture matters to international trade.  First, 
cultural identity “provides patterns of values and standards in shaping motivational orientations 
and attributes, and consequently in personality formation.”85  This same argument applies to 
goods themselves because products and the country of origin have unique characteristics akin to 
personalities.  Second, cultural identity “guides and directs the behavior of individuals and 
societies,” thus creating collective preferences for trade.86  Finally, cultural identity “helps 
individuals organize the world” by creating common codes to facilitate affiliation with the 
environment, groups and oneself.87  This same principle applies to goods themselves because 
human seek invariably to categorize and classify goods by their characteristics, one of which 
includes cultural identifiers.
A recent spate of commercial anti-Americanism illustrates why culture and societal values 
that imbue traded goods matters to importing societies. Iconic American companies such as 
Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Marlboro and General Motors reported slumping sales in “old Europe” 
where it is well known that popular support for American foreign policy is dismal.88  European 
consumers appear to be manifesting their virulent disapproval of U.S. foreign policy by avoiding 
American brand-labeled products, which in isolation are generally indistinguishable from “like” 
non-American products.  Hence, European tastes discriminate against products identified as 
“American” on the basis of societal and political values unrelated to the product.
Consumers identify products by the national brand that makes them.  For example, sale of 
the Scottish Glenmorangie whisky company to French owners has stirred interest in recent weeks 
85




 Dan Roberts, “Well-known US Brands see sales in Europe Fall,” Financial Times 1, Oct. 25, 2004.
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because the Scottish company, like many, has a strong national identity that faces erasure.89
Corporate nationality is important because it characterizes a company’s business style and 
influences corporate behavior.90  “Decision-making is influenced by the culture in which the 
executives were educated, work and live.”91  Thus, it is important for companies to associate 
their product’s identity with the owner’s national culture because local commerce breeds 
successful business leaders, autonomy and pride.92  Therefore, trade policies that discriminate 
between “like products” is sometimes justified because Scotch-owned Glenmorangie whisky is 
inherently distinct from French-owned Glenmorangie whisky.  This argument should not be 
construed to justify protection of waning domestic industries.  When maintained by developing 
countries to protect products’ cultural identity, however, Panels and the Appellate Body should 
defer, which is consistent with the object and purpose of GATT’s Article 20 exceptions and the 
controlling instrument’s special or differential treatment clause.
In the context of collective preferences, the European Union (“E.U.”) has lead in molding 
trade policy around its cultural values and public policy concerns.  For example, the E.U. rejects 
the 1999 WTO Beef Hormones decision, which declared its ban in hormone-treated beef GATT 
illegal, and it sets animal-welfare standards for chickens, pigs and cows.93  The E.U. Article on 
collective preferences in international trade suggests creation of a special safeguards clause in 
89
 John Kay, “The brands that are a matter of national interest,” Financial Times 17, Oct. 26, 2004.  
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trade law that would enable a Member to restrict imports based on collective preference.94  For 
developing countries, this proposition already finds legal support in GATT’s Article 20 and 
among the numerous special and differential treatment clauses.95  Additionally, this proposal 
would permit countries to display proclivities towards “like” products produced in developing 
countries, a device this Article suggests would unlock unknowable trade potential in the 
developing world.  
Contrary to the gripes of free trade enthusiasts, developed countries’ demand for products 
with cultural value, such as those produced in the developing world by unique processes, are not 
necessarily protectionist.  Professor Nichols suggests that a ban on a product is just as likely to 
have protectionist motives as a ban on a process, and thus distinguishing between product and 
process is disingenuous.96  Additionally, “the value-laden reasons for tolerating bans on products 
are just as compelling for tolerating the ban on goods made in certain ways.”97  For example, 
many developed countries maintain restrictions in their Generalized Trade Schedules for goods 
produced by forced or child labor.98  The WTO sanctions such trade restrictions in its founding 
Charter and in the GATT.99
In many markets already, consumers identify and select products from developing 
countries on the basis that the products are made by unique processes or because of cultural 
distinctions embedded in the products.  For instance, the expansion of “Fair Trade” brands 
demonstrates the potential for culturally-branded and process-oriented goods.  Although Fair 
94 Id.; Manuela Saragosa, Lamy Bids Farewell With Call for Trade Reform, BBC News World Edition, 
Nov. 17, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4017155.stm [last visited Dec. 13, 2004].
95 See supra Part I.
96 See Nichols, supra note 83 at 14.
97 Id.
98 See Kimberly Ann Elliot and Richard B. Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under 
Globalization?, Institute for International Economics, 2003, p. 80.
99 See Nichols, supra note 83 at 14.
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Trade represents a small share of the market in the coffee trade, its steady growth is evidence of 
a growing collective preference.100  Fair Trade brands and organic products offer an opportunity 
for quality and process-oriented consumers to connect with the developing world.  These goods 
should be accorded special trade protection and developing countries should be entitled to 
protect such enterprises.
Importantly, developing countries are accorded differential trade treatment on the basis of 
their economic development.  In the context of improving and expanding the market for 
developing countries’ exports, developed countries should be permitted to maintain preferential 
trade status for commodities and cultural products on the basis that these products are not “like” 
under Article 3 of the GATT.101  This section argues that such products are unique because of 
cultural and value-laden process characteristics in the country of origin, and because developing 
world production is a value-added alternative.  Under the Border Tax Adjustments’ likeness 
definition, consumer tastes and collective preference for goods produced in the developing world 
would be enough to justify a preferential trade measure.
IV. Untapped Growth and Trade Potential- Informal Economic Sector 
In addition to the connection between cultural values and trade, the international trade regime 
fails to take account of alternative economic forms that are prevalent in the developing world.  
The informal economies in South and Central America alone represent an enormous un-tapped 
100
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resource that WTO jurisprudence and international trade does not recognize.  Currently, 
developing countries’ economies are growing at six percent per annum (6%), which is the fastest 
pace in thirty years.102  Unless structural reforms take place to legitimize the laborers and 
vendors comprising regional trade within these economic hotbeds, external shocks or financial 
bubbles could severely disrupt these economies once again.103  Further, the workers and 
employers within the informal sector lose out on international trade’s benefits because traditional 
law and international trade do not recognize them.  Thus, extralegal commercial transactions take 
place outside traditional markets to the tune of $74 billion in Peru alone.104  Capitalizing and 
legitimizing the informal, extralegal sectors of the developing world represent an enormous pool 
of latent resources that can fuel equitable and efficient trade growth into the future.
To grasp the entire context of the legitimacy crisis, roughly 534 million people can be 
classified as working poor in developing countries.105 In 1997, the working poor constituted 
roughly twenty-five percent (25%) of the employed labor force in the developing countries, and 
approximately ninety-five percent (95%) of the working poor live in low income countries.106
Further, support for privatization, such as that supported by the WTO, has slipped from 46% to 
36% of the population in Latin America.107  In 1993, Mexico City had roughly 150,000 
unlicensed street-vendor stands with another 293,000 in other Mexican Centers.108  In the 
Philippines, around 57% of city residents and 67% of rural people live in extralegal dwellings for 
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which there is no legal title and of which the State has no record.109  In total, Mr. De Soto’s study 
concluded that about 85% of urban land in the developing and former communist world, and 
between 40% and 53% of rural land, is held in informal and extralegal arrangements not 
recognized or protected by the State.110  The value this real estate is estimated to be at least $9.3 
trillion.111
These statistics are not intended to comprehensively survey the demographics or economies 
of developing countries, but rather beg the question.  Has globalization, bent on free trade 
principles, positively distributed wealth in a way that maximizes resource efficiency in the 
developing world?  This is not the first Article to suggest it has not, howeverby arguing that the 
WTO ought to re-shape its identity, this Article poses a sobering perspective.
The unattractive consequence of extralegal property arrangements and informal labor is that 
without government-enforceable legal protection, they cannot derive capital benefits such as 
eligibility for international trade.112  Complex property systems in developed countries provide 
meaningful protection for capital-intensive projects that are the engines for international trade.  
The lack thereof in developing countries acts as a disincentive for such forms of international 
trade as intellectual property.  Indian Pharmaceuticals is a highly pertinent example that 
contrasts the remarkably different stages of property development between developing countries 
and developed ones.
In developing countries where informal economies prevail, information is highly imperfect 
and dispersed, social and professional networks rarely connect, value is a highly subjective and 
109 Id. at 33.
110 Id. at 35.
111 Id.
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localized feature of a product, and otherwise fungible assets rarely exchange for value.  That is, 
transactions do not take place within a regulated framework and resources are underutilized 
because of discrepancies in information and a lack of exchangeability.  What this means for 
international trade is what economists call dead capital or, in other words, inefficient resource 
utilization.
Service industries that underwrite a broad array of legally recognized contractual 
relationships in developed countries might not have those within the informal economies on their 
radar.  Informal and extralegal employment and property arrangements do not lend themselves 
easily to capitalization because bureaucracies in developing countries are ill-equipped to handle 
them.  For instance, in Peru, it takes almost seven years to obtain legal authorization to build a 
house on state-owned land and 207 administrative steps, and 728 steps to obtain legal title for the 
land.113  With such obfuscation, it is not be surprising that few international financiers are willing 
to endure such delay.  Further, opaque administrative processes in developing countries make 
technology transfer, a feature of TRIPS, less attractive for developed countries.114
To guard against financiers who exploit endemic imbalances in informal economies, 
developing countries must be broadly authorized to maintain investment measures that protect 
their resources.  Gaps in information and discrepancies in value for fungible assets are pervasive 
in developing countries and investors often seek to take advantage of un-regulated or lightly 
regulated sectors.  To counteract this force, developing countries must be entitled to the 
protection of investment measures for longer durations than in the developed world, pursuant to 
TRIMS, Article 5.  
113
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Moreover, the laborers in these informal economies work without legal protection, such as 
work condition regulations, working hour limits, unionization, minimum wage rates, etc.  It is 
estimated that informal economic sectors employ between 50% and 75% of all working people in 
the developing world, and these people produce between 20% and 66% of economic output from 
the Third World.115  The sheer enormity of the extralegal workforce in developing countries, 
whose residential and consumer existence is also likely to be extralegal, thwarts attempts by 
developed countries to impose formal developmental reforms.116  For example, imposition of a 
mailbox system for patent applications, such as that introduced in TRIPS and which was the 
basis of the Indian Pharmaceuticals case, is hardly legitimate or effective in a country where the 
majority of inhabitants live, work and purchase within an extralegal environment.  
Developing countries must be given wider latitude to adapt domestic law to meet the social 
and economic needs of its own population before it can cater to zealous traders from developed 
countries.  International trade jurisprudence should judge the sufficiency of such laws not against 
the standards of the developed world, but rather against the internally defined needs of the 
developing country.  Capitalizing the informal and extralegal economies of the developing world 
should be hailed when it satisfies the developmental needs of the populations of developing 
countries, and not the needs of the investors.  Mr. De Soto argues that “Law is the instrument 
that fixes and realizes capital,” and this Article suggests that special entitlements and protections 
for developing countries in international trade law must be applied to this end.117
115
 De Soto, supra note 104 at 85.
116
 For a study on the effects of trade liberalization on labor markets, see Michael Landesmann, Robert 
Stehrer & Sandra Leitner, Trade Liberalization and Labour Markets: Perspective from OECD Economies, 
ILO Employment Articles 2002/41 (2002).
117
 De Soto, supra note 104 at 157.  William R. Cline has written extensively on the topic of trade and 
development with an economic perspective.  See generally William Cline, Trade Policy and Global 
Poverty, Jun. 2004; see also Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontent, Jun. 2002.
26
V. Proposed Reform- The Power of Discourse
The foregoing illustrates that the WTO, through its jurisprudence and the dominance of 
developed countries, reflects a narrow understanding of international trade’s implications for 
developing countries.  Through its indifference to cultural distinctions and its rigid prescriptions 
for economic and legal formality, the WTO is jeopardizing its legitimacy among the developing 
countries’ populations.  This Article suggests that to reverse this destructive course, developed 
countries and dominant trade blocs should transform their trade discourse and re-phrase their 
development agenda.
The E.U., under Pascal Lamy’s leadership, has popularized a “development discourse” by 
integrating “rhetorical action” that favors expansion and promotion of equitable trade with 
developing countries.118 By changing its trade and development discourse from rhetoric that 
favors economic self-interest to to its broader role in international trade, the E.U. shapes the way 
its members perceive trade policy as an instrument to equalize and stabilize the international 
trading system.119  Further, trade policy has considerable political undertones and so adopting a 
pro-development discourse for trade expresses a certain moral and political message to the 
developing countries.  The E.U.’s success in gaining the multilateral support of developing 
countries has earned them a competitive trade and negotiating advantage over competitors, such 
as the U.S.
The E.U. has successfully gained trust from developing countries and it has become the 
largest market for developing countries’ exports while conversely contributing the largest 
118 See Adrian Van Den Hoven, Assuming Leadership in Multilateral Economic Institutions: The EU’s 
‘Development Round’ Discourse and Strategy, West European Politics 256, Mar. 1, 2004; see also
Saragosa, supra note 94.  Many E.U. representatives at a conference in September 2004, entitled “Europe 
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119 Id.
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amount in foreign direct investment and development aid.120  Although this cycle has made 
developing countries somewhat dependent on the E.U. markets, it has fostered a symbiotic trade 
relationship characterized by leniency and understanding.  The E.U. structures its trade policy as 
a pyramid by providing differential access to its markets based on historic and developmental 
characteristics.121  In contrast to the U.S. iron-fisted approach to India regarding its 
Pharmaceuticals industry, the E.U. essentially excused South Africa’s refusal to abide by TRIPS 
so that it could obtain drugs needed to combat AIDS.122  South Africa returned the favor by 
bringing other African countries to the bargaining table in Doha.123
Reciprocity in multilateral trade agreements is another key component that demonstrates a 
willingness to back discourse with action.  For example, the E.U. has liberalized its agricultural 
markets consistent with the Agricultural Agreement by importing 35 billion Euros worth of 
products from developing countries.124  Canada, similarly, recognizes that developing countries 
and LDC’s have low per capita incomes, low levels of human resource development and highly 
vulnerable economies and thus offers many of them duty free and quota free access for eligible 
products.125
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China and France have proclaimed their support for fair and equitable international trade by 
signing a declaration to support “balanced international trade and globalization based on mutual 
benefit.”126  Although both countries have tarnished human rights records, they have extended an 
olive branch by publicly supporting fair trade that seeks to help developing countries.  Their 
promises may not be binding, but they express a set of moral and political values that offsets the 
countervailing free trade rhetoric.  Over time these public expressions of equity, development, 
mutuality and fairness, among others, help to spawn dialogue, promote popular legitimacy, and 
ultimately catalyze political change. 
Discourse is also a way of empowering developing countries in bilateral and multilateral 
trade negotiations.  One the one hand, rhetoric in trade instruments, at trade summits and in 
public statements has already emphasized the connection between trade and intellectual property, 
investment, subsidies and the like.  Trade agreements sometimes even sound like mouthpieces 
for private interests.  Corporate-dominated trade notwithstanding, reshaping the discourse of 
international trade to reflect the needs of developing countries, on the other hand, can embolden 
their status and ensure their opportunity to influence trade policy.  
VI. Conclusion
For too long the WTO has artificially insulated trade discourse and jurisprudence from their 
natural connection with society, the environment, labor and other such public interests.  The free 
trade institution must recognize that it owes its legitimacy and continued feasibility to its 
perception in the developing world, and not to post-industrial developed countries.  Trade policy-
makers should seek to integrate equity, balance, cultural understanding, pluralism and modesty 
principles into trade agreements and not attempt to eschew them as externalities.  Lastly, 
126 China, France Vow to Work For Solution of Global Issue, BBC Monitoring, Jan. 28, 2004.
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developed countries ought to recognize the value-added potential in implementing a trade agenda 
that promotes developing countries’ interests.
